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Abstract 
Alongside the EU–Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), a Strategic 
Partnership Agreement (SPA) between the EU and Japan entered into force in 2019. 
Whereas the EPA enshrines the existing interconnectedness between the Japanese and 
European economies, the SPA remains more aspirational. With an emphasis on shared 
norms and values and recognising an increasingly hostile external environment, the 
EU and Japan are seeking to deepen and broaden their security cooperation. For the 
period 1990–2017, EU–Japan security cooperation is mapped for a broad range of 
security domains. During this period, cooperation has increased notably in domains 
such as economic security, cyber-security and civil protection. In other areas, such as 
military, regional, energy and human security as well as terrorism, the scope of 
cooperation lags behind. Looking forward, the SPA not only reflects a renewed 
interest and level of ambition in the EU and Japan, but also provides them with a 
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New horizons in EU–Japan security cooperation1  
The Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) and the Strategic Partnership 
Agreement (SPA) are recent milestones in the economic and political relations 
between the EU and Japan. In particular, the EPA demonstrates the dramatic changes 
in how Japan is viewed across Europe: whereas in the 1980s, the EU saw Japan 
primarily as a competitor and a challenge, it is now seen as a major economic partner, 
occupying sixth place in EU trade volume. The EU Global Strategy (EUGS) 
recognises that threats to the EU’s or Japan’s position in the global economy are 
likely to have serious repercussions for their growth, their prosperity and ultimately 
also their security. 
 
 There is a direct connection between European prosperity and Asian 
security. In light of the economic weight that Asia represents for the EU 
– and vice versa – peace and stability in Asia are a prerequisite for our 
prosperity. We will deepen economic diplomacy and scale up our 
security role in Asia. (European Union 2016: 37) 
 
The EU and Japan have steadily worked to develop their political relations. The Joint 
Declaration of 1991, the Action Plan of 2001, and the introduction of a Strategic 
Partnership in 2003, enhanced in 2019, mark the evolution of the relationship 
(European Community 1991, European Commission 2001, European Council 2012). 
They also reflect the increased relevance of the EU as a foreign policy actor and, as 
we will argue below, a path towards meaningful EU–Japan security cooperation.2  
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Between 1990 – 2017, the EU and Japan have explored cooperation in a number of 
security domains, encompassing both traditional and non-traditional security sectors, 
but actual collaboration achieved over time has been uneven. Hence a first objective is 
to systematically assess the extent and relevance of EU–Japan security cooperation 
across security domains over this period in order to identify main drivers and barriers 
to cooperation. Our analysis provides a comparative perspective on EU – Japan 
security relations distinguishing between European versus Japanese perspective 
regarding twelve different security domains for three different time periods. The 
comparative analysis allows for an assessment of potential future collaboration in 
terms of unrealised potential but also in response to international developments.  
 
Following Most and Starr (1989), opportunities and constraints can be seen as 
structuring security cooperation. Perceived threats in a particular security domain 
create a demand for collaboration; for example, the North Korean nuclear and missile 
programmes have heightened concerns about proliferation and regional tensions. 
International terrorism, climate change and cyber-attacks, and most recently 
pandemics such as Covid-19 have also received increased attention in EU–Japan 
security dialogues (EUobserver 2020). Yet heightened attention does not always lead 
to more collaboration. EU and Japanese assessments of threat level may vary; for 
example, uncontrolled immigration is high on the EU security agenda while a minor 
concern for Japan. Moreover, the EU and Japan have developed different, and 
occasionally incompatible, policy responses in a particular security domain. These 
regularly reflect structural differences; for example, Japan is a state while the EU 
ultimately relies on its member states in shaping its security policies. Therefore, we 
propose lack of convergence in threat perception and policy response in a particular 
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security sector as the major constraint on collaboration (see also de Prado Yepes 
2017). 
 
While initially focusing on the impact of internal factors and shared values on EU–
Japan security cooperation, we remain cognisant that these effects may be to a large 
extent checked or overridden by external influences, such as changes in the 
geopolitical landscape in Asia and Europe, the rise of China and Chinese assertive 
maritime behaviour, Russian hybrid security threats, and Trump’s ‘America First’ 
policy. The role of the US is particularly important, since it provides critical defence 
protection to Japan and is a pivotal ally of nearly all EU member states via shared 
NATO membership. Standing defence arrangements have not only affected EU 
attempts to develop an autonomous common security and defence policy (CSDP), 
they have also by some measure limited EU–Japan security cooperation. During the 
Cold War, Europe and – even more so – Japan relied on the United States as their 
main security guarantor and consequently saw each other primarily as ‘a friend of a 
friend’. Since 1990, however, Japan and Europe have sought – and to some extent 
have been compelled – to redefine their security strategies, a process that may have 
been hastened along by President Trump. As a result, Japan and Europe, and in 
particular the EU, have not only pursued more independent voices, but they also 
increasingly appreciate each other as ‘old friends’. 
 
The next section provides a systematic and comparative analysis EU–Japan security 
relations map threat perceptions and policy responses across a broad range of security 
domains to assess EU–Japan security cooperation for the period 1990–2017. Relying 
in part on the results from an expert survey, it provides an assessment of trends and 
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patterns over time as well as across policy dimensions. It comprises information on 
levels of threat perception by the EU and Japan, corresponding levels of convergence 
in threat perception and policy response by both partners, and the levels of bilateral 
and multilateral cooperation achieved between the two partners. The general analysis 
is followed by a section identifying factors – both internal and external to the EU and 
Japan – that have conditioned joint cooperation in specific security sectors. The 
subsequent section discusses the future of EU–Japan security cooperation, assessing 
recent changes in the geopolitical landscape in Asia and Europe and the possible 
impact of President Trump’s ‘America First’ policy. The concluding section explores 
the likely impact of the SPA across various security sectors and new horizons of EU–
Japan security cooperation.  
 
Mapping EU – Japan security cooperation from 1990 until 2017 
The overriding objective of security cooperation is to counter perceived threats: allies 
coordinate military operations in response to possible attacks, or they work together in 
cutting greenhouse gas emissions to tackle climate change. Hence, the first guiding 
principle of our investigation is that perceived insecurity creates a demand, or 
opportunity (Most and Starr 1989), for cooperation to more effectively counter threats 
in a particular area. The second guiding principle is that differences in threat 
perception or policy approaches are main barriers, or constraints, to actual 
cooperation. Similar and compatible policies in a particular security domain make it 
easier for partners to cooperate, while cooperation will be more difficult where they 
diverge in their approaches. To better understand variation in security cooperation in 
different policy domains, our theoretical framework therefore focuses on convergence 
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in threat perception and convergence on policy response to such threats in specific 
policy domains.  
 
To provide a systematic and comparative analysis of collaboration in EU–Japan 
security relations, the research proceeded through a number of steps. The first step 
entailed an assessment of official EU and Japanese threat perceptions across twelve 
different security sectors over a nearly thirty-year time period. These assessments are 
scaled as low, medium or high. The second step involved a scaled assessment – again 
classified as high, low or medium – of the degrees of convergence or divergence in 
threat perceptions and policy response thereof between the two partners. The third 
step evaluates whether convergence in threat perception and policy response 
correlated with levels of cooperation between the two partners. And to the extent they 
don’t, to explore whether internal (to the EU or Japan) or external (US, China or 
Russia) influences to EU–Japan security relations across the twelve different sectors 
could help to explain variations. 
 
Empirically, the assessment of threat perception, policy response and cooperation is 
based on an expert survey of European and Japanese researchers. Scholars were 
approached based on their high level of expertise and experience in a particular 
security area. They were identified in a number of ways, such as a review of extant 
literature, online searches (e.g., Google and LinkedIn) but also previous collaboration 
and recommendations. For each security domain, the analysis relies on European as 
well as Japanese scholars.3 First the Japanese and European experts worked together 
in preparing a research paper covering a specific security domain (Kirchner and 
Dorussen 2019). The papers were discussed in three workshops held in Berlin, Kobe, 
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and Brussels in 2017 and 2018. Subsequently, the expert survey collated parallel 
assessments completed independently by the European and Japanese scholars for their 
specific area of expertise. Importantly, the expert survey completed a lengthy process 
in which the scholars examined and deliberated EU–Japan security relations, and the 
survey thus mainly collated the key insights for a particular security domain. The 
approach allowed us to identify not only difference in threat perception and policy 
response between the EU and Japanese government, but possibly also divergent 
perceptions by European and Japanese experts. 
 
The main comparison is however across policy domains. The analysis focused on 
twelve security areas, namely, regional security, military security, (non)proliferation, 
terrorism, organised crime, climate security, energy security, human security, civil 
protection, cyber-security, economic security and (im)migration. Importantly, these 
include both traditional and non-traditional conceptions of security with at least a 
minimum level of salience in either Japan or the EU. Finally, the mapping exercise 
covers three periods in EU–Japan security cooperation: 1991–2000, 2001–2010, and 
2011–2017. These time periods are not only roughly comparable, they also reflect 
meaningful stages in the development of EU–Japan security cooperation. In 1991 the 
Joint Declaration on Relations between the EC and its Member States and Japan 
initiated regular policy dialogues. The 2001 Action Plan for EU–Japan Cooperation 
marks the start of the second period in which security dialogues became a distinct 
feature of relation. The establishment of the EU–Japan High-Level Group in 2011 
provided new impetus to deepen political, economic and security relations that led in 
2013 to the start of negotiations on the EPA and SPA, which were both agreed in 
principle in 2017.  
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To further ensure compatibility over time and across security domains, a simple 
classification of perceived threat levels, convergence and cooperation as low, medium 
or high is applied. Security threats are perceived as high if, in official statements, 
developments in an issue area are regarded as main or significant threats with a high 
propensity to affect the peace and stability of the polity. Importantly, the experts were 
asked to focus on – and identify – official government evaluations. Medium level 
threats are identified as such in official statements but without necessarily involving a 
high propensity to affect the peace and stability of the polity. Threat levels are low in 
a particular area if developments have received little, if any, attention as threats in 
official documents. For each dimension, an EU expert was asked to evaluate the threat 
level for the EU, while a Japanese expert was asked the same for Japan. As an 
indication for overall threat, the lower threat level (of either the EU or Japan) is used. 
By applying the weakest-link assumption (Russett and Oneal 2001), it is presumed 
that the partner with the lower security concerns set opportunities for cooperation; in 
other words, threat perception is understood as identifying a demand or need for 
cooperation. We recognize that threats can emanated for a number of different 
sources, but rather than trying to explain the perceived levels of threat, our analysis 
direct attention to the implications of increased salience of threats (and convergence 




Note: source Kirchner and Dorussen 2019, p. 206. 
Figure 1: EU and Japan threat perception 
Figure 1 summarises levels of threat perceptions for the twelve policy areas. Clearly, 
both the EU and Japan have increasingly identified more areas with high threat levels. 
Between 1991 and 2000, the EU as well as Japan considered threats as high in only a 
small minority of policy areas, while threats were seen as low-level in three (EU) and 
four (Japan) areas respectively. In the last period (2011–2017), threats were seen as at 
least medium level in nearly all policy areas with high threat levels in the majority of 
policy areas. These patterns apply to both the EU and Japan, suggesting that both 
parties have an increasing demand for cooperation on security matters. There is, 
however, a clear difference in what are seen as the primary sources of threat. On the 
EU side, Russia, political instability in the Middle East, and Jihadism are most 
commonly mentioned across policy areas. The main sources of threat for Japan are 






































Convergence is assessed by the extent to which uniform positions exist between the 
EU and Japan. Convergence applies both to the perception of threat as well as to 
relevant policy response in a particular security dimension. Convergence is high if 
both partners agree on the seriousness of a threat and have a high degree of overlap in 
domestic response. Medium convergence indicates either disagreement on the 
seriousness of threats or significant variation or difference in their policy response. 
Low convergence indicates variation in threat perception as well as policy response. 
 
Cooperation is measured by means of the presence of joint actions and formal 
agreements in a particular security dimension. High levels of cooperation require that 
both partners actively and frequently engage in joint actions including the 
involvement of personnel and resources. Cooperation is judged as medium if joint 
actions are infrequent but there is a common understanding and recognition of the 
need to address problems together. At medium levels of cooperation there is still 
evidence of a willingness to commit personnel and resources but there is also 
recognition of barriers to more regular joint action. At low levels of cooperation, joint 
actions are sporadic, leaving any ‘cooperation’ to take place predominantly at the 




Note: Convergence and Cooperation: weakest-link assumption. Source: Kirchner and 
Dorussen 2019, p. 208. 
Figure 2: Policy convergence and EU–Japan cooperation 
 
Since levels of convergence and cooperation were also assessed separately for the EU 
and Japan, Figure 2 applies the weakest-link assumption; this is a conservative 
approach that in effect uses the lowest score as the overall assessment. Over time, EU 
and Japanese responses have become somewhat more compatible and cooperation has 
increased. The number of policy areas with medium convergence has steadily grown 
from two (in 1990–2000) to four (2001–2010) to six (2011–2017). However, no 
dimension has high levels of convergence even in the most recent period. At the same 
time, the number of areas with low levels of cooperation has decreased – from ten in 
second period to eight in the last period. Yet even in the last period, economic 

























of Figures 1 and 2 suggests that levels of cooperation lag behind levels of 
convergence that in turn lag behind the heightened levels of threat perception. 
 
These general patterns, however, hide some interesting variations that apply to 
specific security domains. Figure 3 provides line graphs for each of the twelve 
security domains charting the patterns of threat perception, policy convergence and 
cooperation. Here the weakest-link assumption has been applied to threat perceptions, 
while the evaluations of convergence and cooperation have been averaged, resulting 
in a five-point scale: low, low/medium, medium, medium/high, and high. 
 
 
Note: Kirchner and Dorussen 2019, p. 209.  




The perceived security threat has remained constant at medium level across the three 
periods in two policy areas: military and human security. Threat perception has 
increased to high levels in the areas of regional security, (non)proliferation and cyber-
security, while increasing to medium in organised crime, climate security, energy 
security, civil protection, (im)migration, and economic security. It has decreased to 
low for terrorism, reflecting the low-level of Japanese concerns, but the EU and Japan 
diverge markedly in their perception of the threat of terrorism: whereas it is low for 
Japan, it is high for the EU.  
 
In the latter periods, policy convergence exceeds the level of threat perception only in 
the economic security dimension and terrorism. Economic security is a further outlier 
in the sense that only in this area, the level of cooperation is higher than the level of 
convergence and threat perception. Also in civil protection, the level of cooperation 
exceeds the extent of policy convergence in the final period (2010–2017). In 
(non)proliferation, climate security, cyber-security and (im)migration, levels of policy 
convergence and actual cooperation closely align over the three periods. However, in 
the final period, the level of cooperation remains lower than the level of policy 
convergence in five security areas, namely military security, regional security, 
terrorism, energy security, and human security. Arguably – since threat perception is 
best understood as the need (or demand) for cooperation and policy convergence as a 
constraint or limit to supply – there is a joint demand for more cooperation in eight (of 
the twelve) security dimensions and an unrealised potential for cooperation in five. Of 
these five, in three policy areas (military, regional and human security), actual 
cooperation falls below threats perception as well as policy convergence. 
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The basic assumption that levels of threat perception are linked to levels of 
cooperation does not appear to hold for all security areas, including salient sectors 
such as regional and military security. Moreover, in the five areas where the level of 
cooperation falls below the level of convergence, neither can policy constraints fully 
explain lack of cooperation. What could then explain these deviations? Next, we 
discuss a number of intervening factors as possible obstacles to cooperation. 
 
Obstacles to EU–Japan security cooperation 
A number of intervening factors can be identified that affect correlations between 
levels of threat perception and levels of cooperation, as well as between levels of 
convergence and levels of cooperation. Some of these can be considered as internal 
factors, that is, arising within the EU or Japan or between the two partners, and some 
as external where so-called ‘third actors’ or international crises are involved.  
 
Internal factors 
Arguably, the main internal factors are developments in the field of EU common 
security and defence, domestic defence policy reforms in Japan, and bilateral relations 
between EU member states and Japan. The EU has only slowly developed its CSDP 
and still only has a very limited autonomous military capacity. The CSDP has existed 
for a considerable period in the shadow of the EU economic policy development. In 
1988 France and the UK endorsed the idea of EU military capacity in the St Malo 
Declaration, but only in 1999 did it receive support from the European Council. Yet 
the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty established the position of High Representative for the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), building on the 1992 Maastricht 
Treaty, which had introduced the European Security and Defence Policy. Only by 
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2003 did the EU introduce practical steps such as the first civilian EU police mission 
to Bosnia, the first EU military operation, known as Concordia, deployed to the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and the publication of the European 
Security Strategy (European Council 2003). A further consolidation of CSDP efforts 
took place with the 2007 Lisbon Treaty that introduced a range of defence-relevant 
clauses, including Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), mutual assistance, 
solidarity commitment and the establishment of the European External Action 
Service.  
 
Prior to the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU thus lacked clear 
institutional mechanisms and policies in the field of security and defence. Still some 
EU–Japan security cooperation existed even prior to the Lisbon Treaty, involving, for 
example, non-proliferation, climate, and energy security, all sponsored by UN treaties 
or protocols. In addition, the need to respond to natural disasters facilitated some 
cooperation in the sector of civil protection, an area where the EU had begun to 
develop its own mechanisms (Kirchner et al 2014). The EU also had sufficient 
authority to establish some cooperation in economic security prior to the Lisbon 
Treaty. The security provisions of the Lisbon Treaty increased the scope of security 
cooperation after 2010, but the EU lacks capacity to be an effective partner in 
addressing the militarised threats Japan faces in its region which could explain 
lagging cooperation in the regional and military security.  
 
Particular interests of EU member states can impede, but on occasion also promote, 
EU–Japan level security cooperation. For example, both France and the UK have 
defence cooperation agreements with Japan, involving the development of military 
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equipment (Ueta 2013, 2). Equally, Germany and Japan have extensive economic and 
political ties and share interests on the basis of their strongly export-oriented 
economies. Given the hybrid nature or co-existence of European and national security 
policy, member states are bound to play an important role in EU–Japan level security 
cooperation. However, in several instances the EU has demonstrated that it constitutes 
a security actor in its own right when dealing with Japan. Examples are the anti-piracy 
operation in the Gulf of Aden, the climate change negotiations and counter-terrorism 
measures.  
 
The Japanese government also has to deal with important constraints on its security 
policies. The security reform programmes are decisive for Japan’s ability to engage in 
security cooperation. In particular, the outcome of attempts by the Japanese 
government to change Article 9 of the constitution will affect the room for EU–Japan 
security cooperation, especially when such cooperation involves the deployment of 
military resources abroad. Article 9 is regularly mentioned as an impediment to Japan 
ability to cooperate in areas such as human security (Vosse 2018), military security 
(Akutsu and Duke 2019) and counter-terrorism (Bossong and Bothe 2019).  
 
External factors 
Since 2013 important changes in the geopolitical context have taken place in Europe 
as well as Asia that are likely to shape how ‘third countries’ impact on EU–Japan 
security relations. In the European context, the Russian annexation of the Crimea in 
2014 and mounting threats since then directed at other East European states have 
raised the spectre of a prolonged conflict with Russia. Chinese maritime assertiveness 
in the China seas, involving the Chinese declaration of an Air Defence Identification 
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Zone in the East China Sea in 2013, and the North Korean missile launches, including 
trajectories over Japanese territory, have heightened tensions and the possibility of 
military conflict. 
 
Clearly EU–Japan security cooperation does not exist in isolation but takes place 
within broader and often longer-established security networks, forcing both sides to 
take the interests of so-called third parties into consideration. For the EU and even 
more for Japan, the US has been crucial in shaping and sustaining these networks. 
Most of the EU member states are part of NATO and embrace a broader defence 
arrangement with the United States. In contrast, Japan finds itself in a bilateral 
defence relationship via the US–Japan Security Treaty of 1952, which continues to 
bind Tokyo to the foreign policy decisions of Washington (Gilson 2016). An example 
is the issue of non-proliferation, where Japan’s position of simultaneously promoting 
nuclear disarmament and relying on extended nuclear deterrence by the United States 
has sometimes invited criticism both within the country as well as from abroad 
(Casarini and Tsuruoka 2019). 
 
North Korea’s escalating nuclear threats and assertive Chinese maritime actions in the 
East and South China Sea affect the security of both the United States and – more 
directly – Japan. The perceived need for US protection is to some extent reinforced by 
the Japanese image of the EU as being either unable militarily or unwilling politically 
to be a genuine security provider. It is of course true that the EU is primarily an 
economic rather than a military entity, such as NATO, and is consequently limited in 
terms of providing military assistance. The reference to unwillingness relates to the 
so-called neutral role the EU has adopted in the maritime conflict between China and 
 18
Japan, especially over the territorial claims of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. The 
perceived lack of EU military clout and its neutral political stance amount to what 
Tsuruoka (2008) coins the ‘expectation gap’ in Japan–EU relations. These issues go 
to the heart of EU–Japan regional and military security cooperation and are reflected 
in the low levels of cooperation regional and military security. 
 
The geopolitical changes in Europe and Asia have been further exacerbated by 
uncertainties about the implications of President Trump’s ‘America First’ policy, for 
example with regard to NATO, global trade and climate change. As many of these 
areas are in flux, their impact on EU–Japan security cooperation remains 
indeterminate. The next section examines the steps which the EU and Japan have 
taken either separately or jointly since 2016 in response to the on-going geopolitical 
changes and to uncertainties emanating from the Trump Presidency, and how these 
steps might affect the future of EU–Japan security cooperation.  
 
The future of EU–Japan security cooperation 
Both Japan and the EU are enhancing their respective security and defence capacities. 
A revision of Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, sought by Prime-Minister Abe, 
would create more room to manoeuvre in the Japanese defence posture. Japan is 
already boosting its defence spending, which in 2017 represented 0.9% of GDP, 
compared with an average of 1.3% among European members of NATO and 3.1% in 
America (Economist 2018). Japan has also upgraded its Self Defence Forces through 
the creation of a central command station in April 2018, which will control Japan’s 
five (previously separate) regional armies and a new amphibious brigade (Gale and 
Tsuneoka 2018). Whereas revising Article 9 would undoubtedly strengthen Japan’s 
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capacity in human security missions, there is also a risk that it would harden policy 
positions of China and North Korea and could thus exacerbate regional security 
threats. 
 
Events since 2014 have also encouraged the EU to reinforce the Lisbon provisions 
regarding security and defence; for example, the introduction of the EUGS, the EU 
Military Planning and Conduct Capability, a European Defence Fund to support EU 
defence research and capability development, and an expressed commitment to 
enhance PESCO activities. The EUGS makes a direct connection between European 
prosperity and Asian security, and pledges to deepen economic diplomacy and scale 
up the EU’s security role in Asia. Japan, the Republic of Korea and Indonesia are 
specifically mentioned in this context (European Union 2016). Support for non-
proliferation efforts on the Korean peninsula and upholding the freedom of navigation 
and respect for international law are seen as priorities. The 2018 EU document on 
‘Enhanced EU Security Cooperation in and with Asia’ re-emphasises these aims 
(European Council 2018).  
 
Moreover, rising costs for defence equipment, especially those involving new 
technologies, such as Artificial Intelligence and quantum computing, exert pressure 
for further cooperation. Already, discussions have started on how to involve Japan in 
defence research and capability development projects of the European Defence Fund 
(Tsuruoka and Fiott 2020). These efforts could be strengthened by the EU and Japan 
Partnership on Sustainable Connectivity and Quality Infrastructure (EEAS 2019), that 
was established in September 2019. It calls for transparent procurement practices, the 
ensuring of debt sustainability and high standards of economic, fiscal, financial, 
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social, and environmental sustainability. This agreement could also be seen as a 
riposte to China’s growing assertiveness in regional and global order-shaping 
(Geeraerts 2019). 
 
Further EU–Japan security cooperation might also be expected from Japanese 
attempts to strengthen its peacekeeping mandate, which could pave the way for 
further Japanese participation in EU civilian and military missions in places like 
Africa. Already Japan contributes to the EU anti-piracy naval operation (EU 
NAVFOR – Operation Atalanta) in the Gulf of Aden (Vosse 2018). Both the EU and 
Japan share a common interest in keeping the sea lines of communication open. Japan 
has also undertaken supportive activities in other civilian EU missions in Africa, 
which is in line with its desire for greater involvement in international peacekeeping 
efforts. 
 
Against these potential positive developments in EU–Japan security cooperation, 
there are also potential obstacles to such a development. These might arise from 
internal challenges, such as the possibility of Prime Minister Abe not being able to 
obtain sufficient public consensus for replacing Article 9, or the EU being unable to 
cope adequately with the largely unknown impact of Brexit. Given the large share of 
Japanese trade and investment in the UK, the existing level of bilateral military 
cooperation, and the (occasional) contribution British navy ships make to secure the 
freedom of navigation in the East and South China Sea, Brexit is bound to affect EU–
Japan security relations. 
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From an external perspective, action by North Korea, China, the United States and 
Russia may provide obstacles to EU–Japan security relations. More specifically, a 
further worsening of the nuclear conflict with North Korea, or an even more assertive 
maritime Chinese posture in the East China Sea would inevitably make Japan even 
more reliant on the US for its security.4 
Such developments would also likely undermine any efforts to strengthen EU–Japan 
security cooperation. In particular, an escalation of conflict between Japan and China 
would put pressure on the EU’s so-called neutral stance position in the territorial 
dispute between China and Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. No doubt there 
would also be countermeasures by China to either ensure the maintenance of the EU’s 
neutral stance or the priority of Sino–EU relations over EU–Japan security 
cooperation. Further, increased EU cooperation with China’s Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI) may sway EU preferences, and it would also affect its relationship with both 
Japan and the US and could cause potential conflict, especially with the US. Already 
differences exist between the US and the EU with regard to membership in the Asian 
Infrastructure and Investment Bank, which is the financial instrument of the BRI, in 
that while most EU states have become members, the US and Japan have refused to 
do so. Moreover, not only has the US sought to prevent European states from 
participating it also has started discussions with Japan, India and Australia to establish 
a rival joint regional infrastructure scheme to the BRI, which would support the 
current “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) strategy, which was initiated by Japan 
in 2016. These discussions, in turn, have given rise to Chinese anxiety about the birth, 
or rebirth, of the ‘Quad’ as a polarizing alliance dedicated to China’s containment, 
particularly in the South China Sea (Ujvari 2019:4). One consequence of such 
US/Japan counter-strategies could be rising Sino–US/Japan tensions which would 
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pose challenges to EU attempts to maintain fruitful relations with all three partners. 
On the other hand, it is in the EU’s interest to care abut the FOIP, as the Indian Ocean 
is Europe’s broader neighborhood, linked to the EU via the Persian Gulf, and 
rhetorically, Japan’s FOIP Strategy is in line with the 2016 EUGS in terms of its 
commitment to effective governance and the rule of law (Baldauff 2018).  
In all these calculations, a crucial factor will be the prevailing security relationship 
Europe or NATO has with the United States. The Trump administration has 
emphasized that European members need to increase contributions to NATO to avoid 
jeopardizing the US security commitment to Europe. Combined with a critical stance 
of the Trump administration versus the EU, these US action weaken the role of the 
EU as a security provider in Asia. In a similar fashion, renewed Russian aggression in 
the Ukraine or other East European states may drag European attention and resources 
to localised engagement and might deter efforts to secure stability in Asia and/or give 
support to Japanese security. 
 
Away from the traditional security areas of military and regional security, beneficial 
EU–Japan security developments are likely to arise in some of the non-traditional 
sectors of security. In part, this is promoted by President Trump’s anti-global trade 
and multilateralism stance, which has direct bearings on the way the EU and Japan 
cooperate in the area of economic security. It is interesting in this context that, whilst 
the EU and Japan complain about Chinese flouting of WTO rules, they are still 
prepared to join China in launching a case against the US at the WTO to stop it from 
justifying tariffs on steel and aluminium as security measures (Hanke 2019). The 
close alignment between EU and Japanese positions in response to geo-political 
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Our main aim was to evaluate existing EU–Japan security cooperation and the 
prospects of future collaboration in light of the recently agreed SPA. Rather than 
treating EU–Japan security cooperation as a general phenomenon, a differentiated 
approach was used; the comparison across specific security sectors over three time 
periods spanning 1990 until 2017 introduced a dynamic element in the assessment of 
threat perception, policy convergence and security cooperation. In the initial analysis, 
levels of threat perceptions and convergence of policy responses were considered as 
main determinant for cooperation. However, it was also recognised that these 
opportunities for cooperation could either be promoted or impeded by intervening 
factors that are either internal or external to EU–Japan security relations. In other 
words, perceived threats and relevant policy responses can be deemed a necessary but 
not as sufficient explanation for determining cooperation.  
 
Over the period 1991–2017, the EU as well as Japan faced an increasingly insecure 
environment. They perceived increased threat levels across a growing number of 
policy dimensions, but they did not necessarily agree on the main source of threats. 
During the same period, the EU and Japan have begun to share medium levels of 
convergence and cooperation across a majority of policy dimensions. At the same 
time, economic security cooperation remains the only dimension where the level of 
cooperation is high. Apart from civil protection and economic security, the threat 
perception is higher than the level of cooperation in all dimensions. There remains a 
 24
demand (or opportunity) for cooperation in nearly all dimensions. Finally, the level of 
policy convergence also exceeds the level of cooperation in five dimensions – military 
security, regional security, terrorism, energy security and human security; in these 
dimensions, there remains therefor an unrealised potential for cooperation. 
 
The SPA could be truly relevant. The limited impact from earlier bilateral EU–Japan 
initiatives – the Joint Declaration in 1991 and the Action Plan in 2001 – resulted from 
some intrinsic drawbacks; for example, they were based on lofty security policy aims 
rather than clear priorities or targets. But possibly more significant, their limited 
impact also followed from the absence of a clear EU policy and institutional 
mechanisms in the field of security and defence, which really only kicked in with the 
implementation of the Lisbon Treaty in 2007–2009. 
 
The SPA makes explicit references to more cooperation specifically in areas such as 
military and regional security, which have hitherto achieved mostly low levels of EU–
Japan cooperation. Actions target greater collaboration in military industrial 
production and impeding proliferation via an effective system of export controls of 
dual-use and WMD-related good and technologies. The SPA should also facilitate 
collaboration to address human security concerns. As Vosse (2018: 231) argues: “In 
essence, the EU–Japan SPA is intended to intensify the way the EU and Japan 
cooperate in out-of-area security challenges”. Further cooperative efforts are also 
foreseen in the non-traditional security fields such as on counter-terrorism and 
organised crime, which have in the past received low levels of joint cooperation, and 
on economic security, civil protection, cyber-security, and climate change, where 
already medium to high level of joint cooperation exit. Importantly, a Joint 
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Committee has been established to ensure the proper functioning and the effective 
implementation of the Agreement. 
 
Regardless, a further worsening of relations between Japan and North Korea/China 
could complicate security cooperation with the EU. It will not only make Japan 
increasingly dependent on the US as the main external security provider, it could also 
force the EU to make a difficult choice in building relations with either China or 
Japan. Equally, renewed Russian aggression in the Ukraine or other East European 
states could divert European attention and resources away from its security 
cooperation with Japan. In short, geo-political developments combined with 
entrenched security ties to the United States could mean the EU and Japan continue to 
first of all see each other as ‘a friend of a friend’.  
 
At the same time, the SPA extends and institutionalises major bilateral engagements 
between the EU and Japan as ‘old friends’. At a minimum, the regular meeting 
provide an opportunity for the EU and Japan to confirm their shared position versus 
global challenges; for example, at the leaders’ video conference, the EU and Japan 
stressed the value of bi- and multilateral collaboration in dealing with the Covid-19 
pandemic and reaffirmed their commitment to the SPA (European Council 2020).    
Possibly most significant, the SPA allows to EU and Japan to develop an agenda for 
further cooperation and it has set a framework to establishes collaboration in areas 
such as military procurement and cyber-security that promise to directly enhance 
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contributors. We remain fully responsible for all interpretations of facts and the 
overall analysis. 
2 The focus of our analysis is on EU–Japan security relations, rather than on the 
security relations of individual EU’s member states with Japan, though some attention 
will be devoted to the latter in the section on Internal Factors. 
3 The experts on EU security policies are based across Europe, specifically, Hamburg 
University, Heidelberg University, Italian Institute of International Affairs, Leuven 
University, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Tübingen University, University of 
Essex, University of Luxembourg, University of Maastricht, University of St. Louis 
(USA), and University of Warwick. Japanese experts are based at Japan Society for 
Security Crisis Management, Keio University, Kobe University, National Institute for 
Defence Studies, Setsunan University, Sophia University, and the University of 
Sacred Hearts.  
4 In a recent special issue in International Affairs, Samuels and Wallace (2018) 
Suzuki and Wallace (2018) consider Japanese strategic thinking in response to crises 
in north-east Asia. They envision Japan becoming less rather than more reliant on the 
US and instead enhancing its defensive capacity and broadening its alliance portfolio. 
Interestingly, the special issue does not consider the EU as a possible ally for Japan. 
